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TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK: THEORETICAL
DIFFICULTIES OF ANALYZING COMPELLED SPEECH
CLAIMS UNDER A RESTRICTED SPEECH STANDARD

I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years have passed since Justice Frankfurter famously
announced that it is the "business of a university" to provide
"an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential
freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study." 1 Although Justice
Frankfurter's
proposal
appears
to
be
relatively
straightforward, defining the contours of these "four essential
freedoms" when they conflict with the "essential freedoms" of
other actors becomes overwhelmingly complicated.
Since Justice Frankfurter's pronouncement, courts at all
levels have struggled to define exactly where the freedoms of
the university end and where the freedoms of other actors
begin. This tension between the freedoms of the university and
the freedoms of the individual coalesced in the recent Tenth
Circuit case Axson-Flynn v. Johnson. 2 In Axson-Flynn, an
acting student asserted her First Amendment right against a
university's attempt to compel her to recite a script as written,
even though the script contained words to which she
fundamentally objected. 3 Although the lower court decided this
case using Supreme Court precedent recognizing a person's
freedom against compelled speech, the Tenth Circuit rejected
that approach, asserting that a person's interest in compelled
speech merited no different analysis than that of restricted
speech. 4 Instead, the Tenth Circuit adopted the standard
announced in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a

1. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (citation omitted).
2. 356 F.3d 1277 (2004).
3. Id. at 1281.
4. ld. at 1284 n.4.
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standard that referees the boundary between a student's right
to free speech and a school's right of academic freedom by
analyzing whether the student speech "bears the imprimatur of
the school." 5 If the student speech could reasonably be
perceived to bear the school's sanction, the speech can be
limited as long as the school's actions "reasonably relate[] to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 6
Although the Hazelwood rationale is a sound approach to
refereeing the boundary between student speech and an
administrator's need to protect the reputation of the
institution, adopting the Hazelwood rationale in this particular
instance is fraught with shortcomings. The Hazelwood
standard was developed in response to an administrative
decision to restrict potentially embarrassing student speech in
a school-financed publication that bore the school's name, 7
whereas Axson-Flynn involved a professor compelling a student
to speak as part of a course requirement. 8 By refusing to
acknowledge the differences between compelled and restricted
speech, the Tenth Circuit established a dangerous precedent
that gives the school tremendous deference. Following AxsonFlynn, although students certainly do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate," 9 a college student may shed significant
speech rights at the classroom door.
This paper will discuss the Axson-Flynn decision and its
implications for free speech and education. Part II includes the
factual background and procedural history of the Axson-Flynn
controversy and a discussion of the Tenth Circuit opinion. Part
III analyzes the Tenth Circuit's rationale and offers several
critiques of the court's use of Hazelwood as its primary
analysis. Part IV offers a brief conclusion to the arguments
presented in this paper.

5. Id. at 1285 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988)).
6. Id.
7. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263 (noting that the school principal was
concerned that publishing two student articles would be offensive to the student
paper's readership).
8. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1280 (noting that Axson-Flynn refused to say
words she found offensive during "classroom acting exercises").
9. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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II. AxSON-FLYNN v. JOHNSON
A. Factual Background
Prior to fall semester, Christina Axson-Flynn applied to the
Actor Training Program ("ATP") at the University of Utah. At
her audition with the program's admissions committee, she
informed the committee that she would not say certain words
which she deemed offensive to her religious beliefs. Although
the committee pressed her on her religious objections, the
committee ultimately admitted her to the program. 10
Once Axson-Flynn commenced the program, it did not take
long before her religious objections and the requirements of the
ATP conflicted. In fact, her first assignment of the semester
contained two expletives that she had objected to previously. 11
Without informing her instructor, she modified the script,
performed the scene, and received an "A" on the assignment. 12
Later that semester, Axson-Flynn once again had to don a role
that contained language to which she objected. 13 As this script
had substantially more objectionable language, she voiced her
concern to her professor. 14 Her professor, knowing the earlier
role had similar language, questioned her as to why this had
not come up during her previous assignment. 15 She informed
the professor she had modified the earlier script and that
apparently nobody had noticed. 16 This enraged the professor
and he told her that she must perform the script as written or
receive a "zero" on the assignment. 17 The next day Axson-Flynn
informed the professor that even though taking a zero on that
assignment would allow her to receive a course grade no higher
than a "C," she would not retract from her previous stance and
refused to recite the script as written. 18 Impressed by her
character, the professor retreated from his previous stance and

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1281.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 1282.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

152

[2010

allowed her to adjust not only that script, but any others
throughout the semester to which she objected. 19
At her semester review, Axson-Flynn was once again
confronted about her language concerns and was strongly
urged to modify her stance. 20 Deeming her behavior as
unacceptable, the professors told her to "talk to some other
Mormon girls who are good Mormons, who don't have a
problem with this." 21 When she refused, the committee told
her, "You can choose to continue in the program if you modify
your values. If you don't, you can leave. That's your choice." 22
Seeing this situation as irreconcilable, she withdrew from the
program. 23

B. The District Court
Axson-Flynn brought suit against the University of Utah
and the ATP for violation of her free exercise and free speech
rights under the First Amendment. 24 In analyzing her claims,
the court found that the case "presents a novel question with
regard to the regulation of speech in the educational forum:
does required participation in a University's curriculum
constitute compelled speech ... ?" 25 To decide this question, the
court stated the following:
The relevant test to determine whether compelled speech is
constitutionally impermissible is: 1) whether as a threshold
matter, the speech is compelled, and 2) if so, whether such
compulsion "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control." 26

Although the court found it difficult to precisely define the
"sphere of intellect and spirit" of the First Amendment, the
court did find that the analysis hinges on whether the State
19. !d.
20. !d.
21. Id.

22. !d.
23. Id.
24. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1327-28 (D.Utah 2001), rev"d,
356 F.3d 1277 (lOth Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs contentions under the free exercise clause
are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be addressed.
25. !d. at 1334.
26. Id. at 1335 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
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action "forces the individual to become 'an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he
finds unacceptable."' 27
In applying this analysis to the Axson-Flynn controversy,
the court found that the ATP's course requirements did not
compel Axson-Flynn to espouse any particular ideology, but
rather required her to recite lines which she found offensive. 28
Thus, finding that the actions of the ATP failed to rise to the
level of invasion prohibited by the First Amendment, the court
dismissed the claim by granting summary judgment for the
U ni versi ty. 29

C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the lower court's
compelled speech approach. 30 In an extended footnote, the
Tenth Circuit claimed that although the First Amendment
prohibits a government actor from compelling a person to
speak, that prohibition does not hinge on whether the speech is
ideological in nature. 31 Instead, the First Amendment prohibits
"both what to say and what not to say,'m regardless of the
content of the speech. Thus, although there is certainly a
difference between compelled speech and restricted speech, the
distinction is ultimately "irrelevant." 33
Having rejected the reasoning of the lower court, the Tenth
Circuit engaged in a detailed analysis of the varying types of
speech that can occur in school settings. 34 The court concluded
that campus speech can be divided into three groups: "student
speech that 'happens to occur on the school premises"';
"government speech," which includes speech by those
authorized to speak in behalf of the school; and "schoolsponsored speech," which constitutes student speech the school
"affirmatively. . . promotes." 35 As Axson-Flynn's speech

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

ld. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
ld.
Id. at 1336.
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284 n.4.

Id.
Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-98 (1988)).
ld. at 1290 n.9.

Id. at 1285.
Id. (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923
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occurred within the classroom and was a course requirement
adopted and promoted by the school, The Tenth Circuit
concluded that Axson-Flynn's speech fell within the third
category of "school-sponsored speecho" 36
According to the Tenth Circuit, school-sponsored speech is
governed by Hazelwood School District Vo Kuhlmeiero 37 In
Hazelwood, the Court upheld a school administrator's decision
to eliminate two pages from a student newspaper because the
content could potentially embarrass the school and its
associateso 38 Because the student speech "might reasonably
[be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the school," 39 the
student speech could be restricted, provided that such
restrictions are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concernso"40 Thus, student speech that the school actively
promotes-opposed to speech it merely tolerates-can be quite
restricted provided the school has a legitimate reason for so
doingo 41
In applying this standard to the case at hand, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that "[f]ew activities bear a school's
'imprimatur' and 'involve pedagogical interests' more
significantly than speech that occurs within a classroom setting
as part of a school's curriculumo" 42 Under the Hazelwood
standard, "substantial deference" is given to "educators' stated
pedagogical concernso"43 Operating under such deference, the
court found that the school's interest in "teach[ing] students
how to step outside their own values 0 0 0 by forcing them to 0 0 0
recite offensive dialogue[,] teach[ing] students to preserve the
integrity of the author's work[,] and measur[ing] true acting
skills [by the student's ability to] convincingly 0 0 0 portray an
offensive part" was reasonably related to the ATP's interest in
training professional actorso 44 Thus, the court held that as long
as the educational goal or pedagogical concern was not in
(lOth Ciro 2002))0
36. ld.
37. Id.
38. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
390 !do at 271.
40. !d. at 273.
41. ld. at 270-71, 273.
42. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (citation omitted).
43. !d. at 1290 (quoting Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925)0
44. !d. at 1291-92.
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actuality a
pretext for punishing the student in
unconstitutional ways, it will not be second guessed. But since
there was still a genuine issue of material fact in this case as to
whether ATP's actions were simply a pretext for religious
discrimination against Axson-Flynn, the court reversed the
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings on the remaining factual issue. 45
The Tenth Circuit warned that requiring any greater
scrutiny of pedagogical concerns would "effectively give each
student veto power over curricular requirements, subjecting
the curricular decisions of teachers to the whims of what a
particular student does or does not feel like learning on a given
day. This we decline to do." 46

Ill. ANALYSIS
A. Compelled Speech us. Restricted Speech

Despite the Tenth Circuit's detailed opinion, the application
of the Hazelwood standard appears to be a marked departure
from other compelled speech cases. By deciding a compelled
speech case under the wholesale adoption of a restricted speech
standard, the court inadvertently limited a student's compelled
speech protection.
In Axson-Flynn, the court suggests that the difference
between compelled and restricted speech is without
constitutional significance and consequently, the two types of
speech should be treated identically. To support this notion, the
Tenth Circuit cites Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina, Inc. in which the Supreme Court noted that
"[t]here is certainly some difference between compelled speech
and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech,
the difference is without constitutional significance, for the
First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term
necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and
what not to say." 47 Standing alone, this clearly supports the
Tenth Circuit's notion that compelled and restricted speech

45. !d. at 1293.
46. !d.
4 7. !d. at 1284 n.4 (quoting Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-98).
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should be treated identically. Placed in its original context,
however, a much different interpretation emerges. 48 In Riley,
the Court was not forever eliminating the analytical difference
between compelled speech and restricted speech, but rather it
was responding to North Carolina's assertion that compelled
speech is entitled to less protection than instances of restricted
speech. 49 In light of this context, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that both areas of speech are protected and that simply because
a government actor is compelling an individual to speak does
not entitle the government to any greater deference than if the
government was instead restricting the individual from
speaking. 50
On a practical level, the operation of compelled speech is
quite unique from that of compelled silence. The motivations
behind restricting the speech of another could be quite varied.
To name a few: disagreement with the viewpoint, 51 the content
is offensive, 52 or the time, place, or manner is inappropriate. 53
In contrast, the motivations behind compelling someone to
speak would be quite different. Motivations to compel speech
could be as mundane as creating the appearance that the
citizenry upholds a particular viewpoint, 54 to more offensive
motives such as attempting to actually mandate compliance
with a particular viewpoint. 55 As noted in the lower court's
opinion in Axson-Flynn, the Supreme Court has in several
cases recognized the analytical and motivational difference
between being compelled to speak and being compelled to
remain silent. 56 Despite the fact that this line of cases has
48. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-98.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-505
(1969) (holding that suspending students because they wore black arm-bands).
52. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 4 78 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that
a student's vulgar and profane speech at a school assembly could be restricted).
53. See N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d
757 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a large regional shopping center can restrict free-speech
demonstrations to an appropriate time, place and manner).
54. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding that a state statute
requiring individuals to display the motto "Live Free or Die" on vehicle license plates
violated the First Amendment as an unnecessary compulsion of speech).
55. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking
down a school regulation that mandated students to salute the flag and recite the
Pledge of Allegiance on threat of suspension).
56. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1335 (2001) (referring to
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never been explicitly overruled, the Tenth Circuit rejects this
approach and conflates two radically different aspects of free
speech protection. 57

B. The Danger of Hazelwood in the Compelled Speech Context
By rejecting the compelled speech doctrine, the Tenth
Circuit had to look to the restricted speech cases for guidance. 58
The result was not only awkward, but may prove to completely
eviscerate compelled speech claims from the Tenth Circuit.
Perhaps the greatest danger that Hazelwood presents to
compelled speech claims is its "substantial deference" to the
administrative decisions of educators. 59 The Tenth Circuit
asserts that speech within a classroom is entitled to such
deference because it inherently bears the imprimatur of the
school and relates to pedagogical concerns. 60 Thus, under
Hazelwood, the only protection to the student is that the
restriction must reasonably relate to pedagogical concerns. 61 To
be sure, the Tenth Circuit added one qualification to the
deferential Hazelwood standard that the educator's pedagogical
concern cannot be a pretext for invidious discrimination. 62 But
given the broad deference of the Hazelwood standard, save
blatantly arbitrary restrictions, an institution is free to restrict
student speech within the classroom.
Extending this analysis to compelled speech cases, however,
may potentially allow unconstitutional motivations to compel
student speech to be used as the very pedagogical concerns that
justify such compulsion. The potential shortcomings of this
approach are illuminated once we reevaluate the Barnette case
under the principles announced in Axson-Flynn.
In Barnette, the West Virginia State Board of Education
had adopted a resolution that required all students to
participate "in the salute honoring the Nation represented by

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, and Riley, 487 U.S. 781).
57. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, at 1284 n.4 (lOth Cir. 2004).
58. ld. at 1284-85.
59. Id. at 1290 (citing Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918,
925 (lOth Cir. 2002)).
60. ld.
61. Id. at 1290-92.
62. Id. at 1292-93.
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the Flag" while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. 63 Refusal to
do so should be regarded as "insubordination," punishable by
expulsion. 64 A family of devout Jehovah's Witnesses brought
suit against the school board seeking an injunction to restrain
enforcement of this law-participating in these activities is
against the tenets of their religion and would require their
children to either participate or be expelled. 65
Under the doctrine announced in Axson-Flynn, the first
step would be to evaluate whether the requirement to salute
the flag and recite the pledge was a curricular requirementthus constituting "school-sponsored speech." 66 As the Board of
Education's resolution stated that the salute and recital shall
become "a regular part of the program" of the schools, the
requirement would likely be construed as a curricular
requirement. 67 The conclusion that this is "school-sponsored
speech" is further bolstered by the fact that failure to
participate resulted in expulsion. 68 The second and final step
would be to determine whether such compulsion reasonably
relates to pedagogical concerns. 69 In passing the resolution, the
school board was inspired by a recent amendment to the West
Virginia education statute which required that students be
taught history and civics "for the purpose of teaching, fostering
and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of
Americanism, and increasing the knowledge of the
organization and machinery of the government." 70 As the
standard announced in Axson-Flynn is substantially
deferential, it is difficult to argue how saluting the flag and
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance is not at least reasonably
related to the pedagogical concern of civic duty.
Thus, under the Axson-Flynn doctrine the resolution would
be upheld as a curricular requirement reasonably related to
pedagogical concerns. In Barnette, however, the Court found
that these pedagogical concerns-namely the West Virginia

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
ld. at 629.
Id. at 629·30.
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
Id. at 629.
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287-91.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625.
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School Board's definition of civic duty-were the very
motivations that violated the First Amendment. 71 To the Court
in Barnette, the question was not whether such compulsion was
a curricular requirement, but whether the curricular
requirement invaded "the sphere of intellect and spirit"
proscribed by the First Amendment. 72 Unfortunately, under
Axson-Flynn's deferential standard, evaluating whether the
course requirement invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
proscribed by the First Amendment is impossible.

C. Barnette and School-Mandated Speech
Based on principles derived from Barnette and other
Supreme Court precedent, a more workable standard arises. In
Axson-Flynn, the Tenth Circuit recognized three types of
speech that occur on campus: student speech that happens to
occur on campus, government speech, and school-sponsored
student speech. 73 Instead of grouping compelled speech claims
into the latter group, a more workable standard would be to
recognize a fourth area of campus speech: school-mandated
speech.
Unlike "school-sponsored speech" where the student speech
bears the school's imprimatur and encouragement, schoolmandated speech is actually required by the school through
curricular or other requirements. Instead of focusing on the
curricular requirements and whether the restriction reasonably
relates to pedagogical concerns, the analysis of schoolmandated speech would mirror the analysis employed by the
lower court in the Axson-Flynn controversy. The court would
first decide whether the speech is in fact compelled, and if so,
whether the compulsion "invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit" proscribed by the First Amendment. 74
The difficulty with this standard, however, is defining what
exactly is the sphere of intellect and spirit protected by the
First Amendment. 75 As correctly noted by the Tenth Circuit in
Axson-Flynn, "the First Amendment's proscription of compelled

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

!d. at 642.
!d.
356 F.3d at 1285.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1335 (D. Utah 2001).
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speech does not turn on the ideological content of the message
that the speaker is being forced to carry." 76 Thus, in defining
the "sphere of intellect and spirit" of the First Amendment,
whether the content of the speech is ideological is entirely
irrelevant. 77 Instead, the focus of the analysis should be
whether the government action compels espousal of any
particular view, belief, or ideology_7 8 In effect, what offends the
First Amendment is not the compulsion of any particular type
of speech, but rather compulsion that requires espousal or
endorsement of any particular idea. 79 By focusing the analysis
on whether the compulsion requires espousal of a particular
idea, the court is able to better distinguish between permissible
and impermissible instances of compelled speech. The utility of
this standard was highlighted recently in Forum for Academic
& Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld. 80 Although this case
did not involve an instance of school-mandated speech, the
analytical approach of the court is nonetheless instructive. In
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, law schools and
individual faculty members challenged the constitutionality of
a statute that allowed the Secretary of Defense to deny federal
funding to law schools that prevented military recruiters from
recruiting on campus. 81 Among other claims, the schools
asserted that, by effectively requiring the schools to allow
military recruiters to recruit on campus, the statute was
compelling the schools to endorse the military's recruiting
message. 82 In evaluating the compelled speech claims, the
court found that requiring recruiters to come on campus did
"not present the scenario of directly requiring a private speaker
to participate in the dissemination of a particular message." 83
Indeed, the school was still free to disclaim any message of the

76. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284 n.4.
77. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)
("Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected.").
78. See Phelan v. Laramie County Cmty. Coli. Bd. of Tr., 235 F.3d 1243, 124 7
(lOth Cir. 2000) ("The crucial question is whether ... the government is compelling
others to espouse or suppress certain ideas and beliefs.").
79. Id.
80. 291 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003).
81. Jd.at274-75.
82. Id. at 309.
83. Id.
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military with which it disagreed. 84 To the court, proscribed
compulsion involves "an outright regulation on speech and a
patent attempt by the government to 'prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."' 85 The military requirements fell short of this sort of
proscribed prescription. 86
Applying the school-mandated standard to Axson-Flynn, the
first question is whether the school requirements compelled
Axson-Flynn to speak. As recognized by the Tenth Circuit, in
order to pass the class and fulfill the program requirements,
she had to recite the play as written. 87 Thus, if she wanted to
graduate from the ATP, Axson-Flynn had no choice but to say
the offensive words. 88 By requiring Axson-Flynn to recite
certain words, the ATP clearly compelled Axson-Flynn to
speak. 89 The question then becomes whether the school's
requirements forced Axson-Flynn to espouse or endorse a
particular idea or belief. In forcing Axson-Flynn to recite the
play as written, the faculty had no intention of her actually
endorsing or espousing the viewpoints expressed within the
script. 90 Intriguingly, the fact that she would never endorse
such views was precisely why the faculty felt it so important for
her to recite the play as written. 91 The faculty never intended
Axson-Flynn to espouse any particular viewpoint, but rather
wanted to see if she could accurately portray a character with

84. !d.
85. Id. at 309-10 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
86. For cases that employ a similar test for compelled speech protection, see Gay
Rights Coal. of Georgetown v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (rejecting as a
violation of the First Amendment a gay rights group's efforts to require the government
to force Georgetown to grant them university recognition); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Uti!. Comm'n of Cal., 4 75 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) (rejecting as a violation
of the First Amendment a state law that required a utility company to distribute
potentially adverse propaganda with billing statements); Miami Herald Pub!'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting as a violation of the First Amendment a state
law that required a newspaper to provide space to political candidates it opposes).
87. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (2004) ("There is no question in
the instant case, Defendants attempted to compel Axson-Flynn to speak.").
88. !d. at 1282.
89. !d. at 1290.
90. See id. at 1291-92.
91. !d. at 1291 (noting the ATP's belief that requmng students to portray
characters with which they disagreed helped measure "true acting skills").
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which she morally disagreed. 92 Thus, although the program
requirements compelled Axson-Flynn to speak words she found
offensive, the school's mandate falls short of the espousal
proscribed by the First Amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the evident shortcomings of the Tenth Circuit's
opinion, in finding for the University, the court nonetheless
decided the case correctly. Notwithstanding, the Tenth
Circuit's rejection of the compelled speech doctrine in favor of a
new standard based on Hazelwood stands as a dangerous
precedent that could potentially limit the effectiveness of
compelled speech claims in school settings in the future.
One of the fundamental freedoms afforded to universities is
the ability to decide what is to be taught. This ability, however,
is not universal. Although universities should be granted broad
discretion when making and enforcing curricular requirements,
the university should be restricted from compelling a student
to adopt a particular idea, belief, or viewpoint. In evaluating
these actions, "[t]he crucial question is whether. . . the
government is compelling others to espouse ... certain ideas
and beliefs." 93 By focusing on this crucial question, courts will
be able to better determine when school-mandated speech
exceeds the boundaries of permissible curricular requirements
and violates the First Amendment's proscription of compelled
speech.
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